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STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS 
AT THE PYEONGCHANG WINTER 





This article draws on content and sentiment analysis of  a sample of  internation-
al English-language media reports to identify the core elements of  the Demo-
cratic People’s Republic of  Korea (DPRK) strategic communications campaign 
conducted at the PyeongChang Winter Olympics, and to establish groundwork 
for an assessment of  its effectiveness. Using the Olympics as a stage for stra-
tegic communications is as old as the games themselves. The article examines 
the structure and elements of  a DPRK Strategic Communications campaign by 
locating it in historical and theoretical context, and shows how it bears the hall-
marks of  a carefully crafted and timed agenda-setting campaign. Subsequent to 
the games, the supreme leader of  the DPRK, Kim Jong-un, met with President 
Moon Jae-in of  South Korea, to discuss a full peace treaty and, in June 2018, met 
with President Trump of  the United States. Irrespective of  the ultimate out-
come of  these engagements, a month before the games such a meeting would 
have been inconceivable. We contend that the 2018 Winter Olympics held in the 
Republic of  Korea (ROK) provides a case study for assessing how influencing 
discourses in the media space may impact the conditions of  possibility for inter-
national political action. 
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Introduction
In February 2018, as the 23rd Winter Olympic Games approached, there had 
been a notable increase in tension on the Korean peninsula. In 2016, the UN Se-
curity Council had adopted Resolution 2270, leading to measures against Pyong-
yang taken by the Council of  Europe. The preceding 12 months had seen the 
leadership of  the Democratic People’s Republic of  Korea (DPRK) under Kim 
Jong-un, grandson of  founder Kim Il-sung, launch 23 missiles during 16 tests, 
apparently refining its technology with each launch. In July 2017, North Korea 
conducted its first test of  an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which 
it claimed could reach ‘anywhere in the world’.  A further launch, taking place 
during the early hours of  29 November 2017, flew higher and farther than any 
previous test launch. That missile, which landed in Japan’s exclusive economic 
zone, came after a break in testing of  almost two months. 
Where the Obama administration’s posture of  ‘strategic patience’ represent-
ed hopes that North Korea might voluntarily de-nuclearise or spontaneously 
implode, the regime’s rapidly growing nuclear confidence led to a change in 
posture by Donald Trump’s White House. Then US Secretary of  State Rex Til-
lerson announced the end of  the policy of  ‘strategic patience’ in March 2017, 
and declared that ‘all options are on the table’. During the latter half  of  2017, 
international concern mounted over what this meant for the complex security 
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balance in North East Asia. Communicating that the era of  ‘strategic patience’ 
was over did not explicate what outcome, short of  a preemptive war, would suit 
the Trump administration, and what posture South Korea would assume. This 
febrile security environment coincided with a change in administration in South 
Korea; the sitting president was impeached and Moon Jae-in, a former human 
rights lawyer and son of  North Korean refugees, was elected in May 2017. 
Relations between the DPRK and the ROK have been cyclical in nature. Periods 
of  high tension and escalation marked by overtly hostile communications and 
missile or nuclear testing have alternated with periods of  rapprochement. The 
North has previously been effective in leveraging these cycles to extract mon-
etary aid and development assistance.1 The DPRK’s first leader, Kim Il-sung, 
extracted almost $US20 billion in economic and military aid from the USSR and 
China, and used the war with the South to prop up his hold on power in the 
face of  early challenges.2 Recent history reflects an established pattern of  nu-
clear testing and missile launches as a prelude to negotiations and engagement, 
followed by further tests.3 
Widespread cynicism regarding the DPRK’s unexpected offer to participate in 
the PyeongChang Games4 in January 2018 reflected a belief  that the DPRK 
simply aimed to extract financial assistance from the newly emollient South, 
potentially through an easing of  sanctions. Whilst heading off  risk of  a US-led 
intervention, it was also seeking to reinforce potentially fraying domestic regime 
stability. On the other hand, the PyeongChang Olympics appeared to some to 
present a real opportunity for reconciliation between the North and the South, 
as well as reducing the possibility of  disastrous, full-blown conflict with the 
US. It is certainly possible that the DPRK now envisages a peacefully united 
peninsula. 
Hopeful responses to the DPRK’s participation in the PyeongChang Games 
reflect a widespread assumption that major sporting events can function as tools 
1 Andrei Lankov, ‘Changing North Korea: An information campaign can beat the regime’, Foreign Affairs 88:6 
(2009): 95–105.
2 Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton University Press, 
2002).
3 Victor Cha, James Lewis, Jenny Jun, Scott LaFoy and Ethan Sohn, ‘North Korea’s Cyber Operations, Strategy 
and Responses’, Report for CSIS Korea Chair (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2015).
4 PyeongChang was spelled with a capital C in the Olympic marketing materials to differentiate it from Pyong-
yang for foreign audiences.
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of  reconciliation, and that sport ‘brings people together’.5 The Olympics have 
been thought to exemplify the pacifying potential of  sport. There is a long his-
tory of  projects of  national reconciliation using the Olympics as a platform for 
communications aimed at fostering unity, for example, between West and East 
Germany, or in Yemen after its previous civil conflicts.6 On the other hand, 
the Olympics are clearly not free of  international tensions; there have been re-
current calls for boycotts, including Spain’s boycott of  the 1936 Berlin Games 
due to differences with Germany, and the African nations’ boycott of  the 1976 
Montreal Games due to the failure of  the International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) to ban New Zealand for participating in a rugby tournament in South 
Africa still under Apartheid.
Whilst the historical record is mixed regarding the relationship between sport-
ing events and peace-making, the Olympics constitute a unique venue for in-
ternational strategic communications. International strategic communications 
are defined here as planned interventions into the information environment, 
with observable effects on that environment, which serve international political 
ends. The Olympic Games are a platform that is conducive to specific kinds of  
communication by states, and thereby constitute a unique avenue to measurable 
influence. There is evidence to support the hypothesis that the DPRK viewed 
the PyeongChang Olympics as a political opportunity to shape its representation 
by the international media. We argue below that DPRK strategic communica-
tions using the Olympics have been effective to some degree, inasmuch as they 
influenced the tone and content of  international coverage within our sample of  
English-language media. 
Any perception by the DPRK that it succeeded in creating behavioural change 
in other countries through its Olympic communications may shape its subse-
quent actions, but measuring the influence of  strategic communications on oth-
er international actors’ decision-making is challenging. In the aftermath of  the 
Olympics, a US-North Korea summit was proposed and accepted, resulting in a 
face-to-face meeting between President Trump and Kim Jong-un in Singapore. 
Over the course of  a single month, the mood and tone of  engagements among 
the DPRK, the ROK, China, and the US turned to diplomacy and talks. The 
presence of  multiple variables, including changing attitudes amongst a Chinese 
5 Liam Stockdale, ‘More than just games: the global politics of  the Olympic movement’, in Spaaij, Ramón, and 
Cindy Burleson (eds) The Olympic movement and the sport of  peacemaking (Routledge, 2016): p. 83.
6 Ibid.
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leadership keen to quieten the security situation on its borders, sanctions, and 
the unpredictability of  Trump himself, must foster caution regarding linear ex-
planations for this change on the basis of  our media sample. Though, it is note-
worthy that claims that the DPRK may have been forced to the table by sanc-
tions are tempered by the lack of  material concessions offered by the DPRK 
in subsequent talks with the US. It seems clear that the DPRK responded to 
the environment in which it found itself  in late 2017 by launching a strategic 
communications campaign at the Olympics. In this article, we identify the ele-
ments of  that campaign and make a preliminary assessment of  how it may have 
influenced subsequent events. 
To conduct this research, we undertook a qualitative analysis of  a sample of  
international and domestic (South Korean) English-language media reporting 
of  DPRK activities at the games. Our analysis identifies how DPRK strategic 
communicative actions at the PyeongChang Olympics were received, and pro-
vides a preliminary assessment of  their influence on the tone of  reports in the 
international media. We examined 110 English-language articles, including re-
ports from the leading international news wire services; all major US television 
channels; the major print media in New York, Washington DC, and around the 
US; magazines (from Time and Esquire to Cosmopolitan and People); global media 
including the BBC, CNN, and Al Jazeera; the UK media from the Sun to the 
Telegraph; as well as coverage from Canada to the Antipodes. We sorted these 
articles for their focus, then subjected them to sentiment analysis to identify 
ways in which the DPRK may have contributed to setting the agenda and tone 
of  international media discourse. 
We were interested in the degree to which North Korean messaging at the 
Olympics appears to have influenced the content and tone of  English-language 
media coverage as the English-language media were overwhelmingly negative 
in their representation of  the DPRK prior to the Olympics.7 Focusing on En-
glish-language media facilitated coding across the sample, but it is also justified 
inasmuch as they are an influential source of  secondary news content globally. 
Local ROK-based English-language media representations of  the North—gen-
erally translations of  articles from local media—are constrained by the National 
Security Law, which prohibits positive representations of  the North. However, 
they provided a sample that could be effectively compared with international 
7 Hyun-jin Seo, ‘International media coverage of  North Korea: study of  journalists and news reports on the 
six-party nuclear talks’, Asian Journal of  Communication, 19:1 (2009): 1–17.
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content. This is a groundwork study, laying the foundation for robust prelimi-
nary hypotheses that we plan to test in further research, expanding the analysis 
to include other likely target audiences for DPRK Olympic communications. 
Such research will test preliminary findings by comparing English-language me-
dia sentiment with content and sentiment in Chinese- and Korean-language me-
dia before and after the PyeongChang Games. 
In the first section, we outline the historical and geopolitical context for DPRK 
strategic communications. In the second section, we examine the background 
for strategic communications on the Olympic stage and what is distinctive about 
this forum. These sections provide the theoretical grounds for positing that it 
is advantageous to view DPRK participation in the Olympics in the context of  
strategic communications. In the third section, we analyse the dominant narra-
tives in our sample of  English-language media reports about the Games. We 
identify three areas of  activity that appear to constitute the pillars of  a DPRK 
strategic communications campaign conducted at the Games, evident in the 
three most widely-reported communicative actions undertaken by the North:
1) the joint-Korean team presence at the opening and closing 
ceremonies;
2) the Cheerleading squad that accompanied the DPRK team;
3) the stage-managed presentation of  Kim Jong-un’s sister Kim 
Yo-jong at the Games. 
We conclude that North Korea appears to have waged a relatively effective agen-
da-setting campaign. Effectiveness is a measure of  the degree to which planned 
DPRK communicative actions influenced English-language media coverage of  
the PyeongChang Olympics. Whilst our findings are provisional, they provide 
grounds for further comparative research to test this hypothesis against a larger 
multilingual media sample. Irrespective of  the ultimate intentions of  the DPRK, 
their apparent ability to influence the agenda of  international news reporting 
using the Olympic Games as a political stage is suggestive of  how strategic 
communicative action can create opportunity spaces in world politics. Whilst we 
do not posit linear causation regarding subsequent changes to US foreign policy 
behaviour, DPRK communications at the Olympics influenced discourses with-
in the information environment, which form part of  the context for behavioural 
change. 
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DPRK international strategic communications in context
The North’s international strategic communications should be understood in 
light of  its domestic propaganda. The regime adopted many of  the elements of  
Stalin’s USSR, combining a cult of  personality centered around the Kims with 
the idea of  a sacred mandate that legitimates their rule. As noted by McFate, 
North Korean internal propaganda involves a combination of  ‘top down cul-
ture, intentionally imposed by the regime to instil certain behaviours and norms, 
and bottom up culture, organically developed over the course of  centuries of  
Korean history’.8 As such, stable, endogenous, inter-Korean values, including 
self-sufficiency, family loyalty, ‘small group communalism’, and conceptions of  
the sacred, are also critical to the regime. This is particularly clear in the con-
cept of  the Kims’ ‘Mandate of  Heaven’, which justifies hereditary rule,9 and in 
the national ideology of  Juche. Invented by Kim Il-sung, and tightly bound up 
with the sacred coding of  the regime, ‘Juche legitimises cultural, economic, and 
political isolationism by stressing the error of  imitating foreign countries or of  
becoming excessively international.’10
Considerable effort has been expended to project an image of  the supreme 
leader Kim Jong-un to both domestic elite and North Korean youth audienc-
es as energetic and likeable, generously forgiving ‘defectors’ who return to the 
North after travelling abroad.11 Kim’s position is not yet certain within the state 
apparatus, as prominent defector Thae Yong-ho recently testified: ‘while on the 
surface the Kim Jong-un regime seems to have consolidated its power through 
[a] reign of  terror […] there are great and unexpected changes taking place 
within North Korea’.12 The stability of  young Kim’s rule relies on maintaining a 
narrative of  technological advancement and modernity.13 Domestic propaganda, 
projected through tightly-controlled state media, centres on the concept of  a 
‘modern socialist paradise’. The central content of  this claim is ‘that North Ko-
rea is the most technologically and spiritually advanced country on earth’, with 
8 Montgomery McFate, ‘Manipulating the architecture of  cultural control: A conceptual model for Strategic 
Influence Operations in North Korea’, Journal of  Information Warfare, Volume 4:1 (2005): 22.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., p. 34
11 Enrico D’Ambrogio, ‘European Parliamentary Research Service, North Korea’s propaganda strategy’, Europe-
an Parliament Briefing (October 2016).
12 Thae Yong-ho, ‘Testimony of  Minister Thae Yong-ho’, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(Washington, DC, 1 November 2017).
13 D’Ambrogio, ‘European Parliamentary Research Service’.
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South Korea a poor relative.14 Whilst this was perhaps an accurate description 
of  the comparative situations immediately after the War, the South has devel-
oped at a significantly greater rate than the North.15 This ideologically significant 
claim is thus vulnerable, which likely explains why so little of  the PyeongChang 
Olympics was broadcast inside the DPRK.16 This also suggests that any DPRK 
strategic communications at the Olympics were targeted primarily at external 
audiences.
The North has a developed capability for international information activities, 
including the spread of  anti-ROK and anti-US propaganda, a function that is 
apparently led by Kim Jong-un’s sister who headed the North Korean delegation 
to the Winter Olympics.17 During the period leading up to the Games a cam-
paign of  disruptive cyber-attacks targeting institutions in the South and banks 
worldwide was widely attributed to the North.18 Whilst there is debate about the 
strategic communications function of  these attacks, for example the degree to 
which they were intended to function as a deterrent, their economic focus is also 
thought to provide evidence that economic sanctions were biting.19 The DPRK’s 
open pursuit of  nuclear and missile weapons programmes throughout 2017, 
alongside demonstrations of  informational and cyber capabilities, have been 
described by H. Pak Jung as signaling to the DPRKs key international target 
audiences—the ROK, China, and the United States—the regime’s commitment 
to ensuring the country’s ‘independence and sovereignty under the leadership of  
the Kim family and to maintain[ing] strategic relevance and [the] ability to drive 
events on the Korean Peninsula’.20 
Whilst DPRK domestic propaganda dismisses the South as a corrupt and ve-
nal dictatorship, their cross-border strategic communications are better fitted to 
those target audiences. In the immediate run-up to the Olympics, its messages 
were clearly intended to be positive and welcoming. North Korean propaganda 
material is often found scattered around public places in Seoul. In early 2018, 
a series of  new DPRK propaganda fliers and leaflets that appeared there, pre-
14 Lankov, ‘Changing North Korea’, p. 98.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., pp. 95–105.
17 D’Ambrogio, ‘European Parliamentary Research Service’.
18 Paul Mozur and Sang-hun Choe, ‘North Korea’s Rising Ambition Seen in Bid to Breach Global Banks’, New 
York Times, 25 March 2017.
19 Min-kyung Jung, ‘Cash-strapped North Korea turning more to cryptocurrecy’, The Korea Herald, 19 December 
2017.
20 H. Pak Jung, ‘Regime Insecurity or Regime Resilience? North Korea’s Grand Strategy in the Context of  
Nuclear and Missile Development’, Brookings Institute (February 2018) 
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sumed to have been dropped from balloons, showed the 2018 PyeongChang 
Olympics logo and its two cartoon mascots standing beneath the Olympic rings. 
One side showed the Winter Olympics mascots welcoming guests from Pyong-
yang who were arriving for the Games. The reverse side showed them striding 
side-by-side, saying ‘Let’s go to Kaesong! Let’s go to Mount Kumgang!’—a ref-
erence to the now closed inter-Korean industrial zone and failed inter-Korean 
tourist project that sit just inside North Korea. The South Korean government 
closed Kaesong in 2016 in protest over North Korea’s nuclear and missile pro-
grammes. The inter-Korean Mount Kumgang resort lies in the coastal province 
of  Kangwon, which is divided by the border between the two Koreas. It was 
closed after a South Korean tourist was shot by a North Korean guard in 2008. 
These propaganda leaflets thus suggested to audiences in the South that the 
Olympics could provide an opening for a return to friendly inter-Korean co-
operation. North Korea simultaneously announced a new ‘world-level’ tourist 
project in Kangwon province that appeared to be aimed at capitalising on the in-
ternational attention surrounding the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, which 
lies in the South Korean half  of  the province.21 
This suggested that the North was launching a new strategic communications 
campaign as the PyeongChang Games approached, the tone of  which was in 
striking contrast to the belligerent messaging that had marked the prior six 
months and had contributed to intensifying sanctions. The threatening rhetoric 
between the US and the DPRK, which had accelerated throughout 2017, had 
been accompanied by a tightening of  international sanctions under pressure 
from the US. By the end of  2017, the DPRK had completed a series of  missile 
tests, which, it claimed, established North Korea’s nuclear deterrent capability, 
rendering the possibility of  conflict on the peninsula more dangerous for ev-
eryone. The DPRK claim of  having completed its efforts towards developing 
an operational nuclear missile deterrent capacity suggested that the North now 
saw an interest in de-escalating tensions with the United States. This would be in 
keeping with the cyclical de-escalatory bargaining patterns observed in DPRK 
behaviour over time.22 Since any evidence of  productive engagement with the 
international community would undercut arguments for further pressure to be 
exerted, either militarily or through sanctions, it is reasonable to infer that the 
DPRK’s participation in the Olympics constitutes part of  a wider effort to soft-
21 James Pearson, ‘North Korea sends winter Olympics fliers to Seoul: website’, Reuters, 5 February 2018.
22 Lankov, ‘Changing North Korea’.
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en its international representations, particularly those within English-language 
media widely consumed by key US audiences and policy-makers. The interna-
tional English-language news wires dominate media discourse around the world, 
shaping the information environment in which the international community de-
liberates. 
Through participating more actively in sanctions in 2017, China had signaled 
that there were limits to its patience with regards to DPRK actions, which un-
doubtedly featured in DPRK calculations. The North’s Juche or ‘national self-re-
liance’ ideology, put in place by Kim Il-sung and maintained by Kim Jong-un, 
has, in practice, meant an increasing dependence on its powerful neighbour. Mao 
and successive Chinese leaders viewed North Korea as ‘close as lips and teeth’, 
and an important buffer against the threat of  a united peninsula under US influ-
ence. China is the only continental state that shares a border with North Korea. 
The Chinese leadership and population thus constitute a key target audience for 
North Korea’s strategic communications.23 China is the DPRK’s predominant 
trading partner, both explicit and covert, and its principle source of  fossil fuels. 
Whilst the English-language media are the target for strategic communications 
aimed at the US and the international community, influencing representations 
within the Chinese-language media is likely to be another key regime objective. 
The timing of  the DPRK’s projection of  more emollient messaging also made 
considerable sense in light of  the ROK’s desire for the Olympics to be a ‘good 
news’ story for the peninsula. The friendly disposition of  the new Moon gov-
ernment in the South assured a positive reception of  DPRK overtures across 
the border in January 2018. South Korea’s role as Olympic host must be under-
stood in the context of  the state’s own strategic communications objectives. The 
ROK has embraced global trade as its mantra since the Korean War, and has 
adopted a free-market system with distinctive characteristics that led to GDP 
growth from less than $US 100 per capita in 1961 to more than $US 25,458 in 
2016. South Korea has been hailed as a regional ‘cultural powerhouse’, success-
fully exporting cultural products as far afield as New Zealand and the United 
States, as well as closer to home—to China, Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, Viet-
nam, and the Philippines.
South Korea seems to ‘think in terms of  relational power, rather than simply 
23 Yu-Hua Chen, ‘China and North Korea: Still “Lips and Teeth”’, The Diplomat, 21 July 2018.
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thinking in terms of  the distribution of  content around the world’.24 The term 
hallyu or ‘Korean Wave’ was first coined by the Chinese press in the late 1990s to 
describe the growing popularity of  Korean pop culture in the country.25 What 
started as a South Korean marketing campaign for selling products to East Asia, 
then went global with the sale of  K-dramas and K-pop, has now grown to 
the worldwide marketing of  a broad range of  South Korean products such as 
fashion, food, and makeup. The Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency 
(KOTRA) and the Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange (KO-
FICE) announced on 10 April 2016 that the hallyu content exports from South 
Korea totaled 3.2 trillion won (US$2.8 billion) in 2015, to show year-on-year 
growth of  13.4%. The estimated effect of  the export of  cultural content on 
other products was 15.6 trillion won.26 This global marketing of  K-culture has 
been further enhanced as part of  a policy of  boosting national image by invest-
ing in broadband infrastructure, technology, and entertainment industries. This 
has not only resulted in economic growth but has also boosted bilateral relations 
and the expansion of  the country’s ‘soft power’.27 The Olympics were clearly 
intended to sit within and resonate with these soft power efforts. The tagline of  
the 2018 Winter Games was ‘Passion Connected’, symbolic not only of  Korea’s 
place in the global economy but also of  its investment in its Internet and tele-
communications infrastructure. South Korea, the world’s 12th largest economy 
and 6th largest exporter, is now the most connected country on earth.28
Moon Jae-in’s election as President of  South Korea in May 2017 provided a 
vindication of  constitutional process in ROK. The current popularity of  the 
Democrat Party comes from its promise of  a clean and transparent government 
restoring faith in political institutions by addressing the influence wielded by the 
influential ‘chaebol’ (business conglomerates) such as Samsung, and by pursuing 
a softer policy towards the North. Moon’s instincts and his party’s traditions fa-
vour an accommodation with Kim Jong-un. The left wing of  Moon’s party con-
24 Terry Flew, ‘Entertainment media, cultural power, and post-globalization: The case of  China’s international 
media expansion and the discourse of  soft power’, Global Media and China, 1:4 (2016): 278–94, p. 278.
25 B.H. Chua and K. Iwabuchi, East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave (Hong Kong University Press: 
2008), J. Parc and H.C. Moon, ‘Korean dramas and films: key factors for their international competitiveness’, 
Asian Journal of  Social Science, 41:2 (2013): 126–149; Jonathan R Woodier and Sung-woo Park, ‘Republic of  Korea: 
K-culture and The Next Wave of  Economic Growth’, International Journal of  Cultural and Creative Industries, 5:1 
(2017): 70–81.
26 Jung Min-hee, ‘South Korea’s Hallyu Content Exports Reached US$2.82 Billion Last Year’, Business Korea, 11 
April 2016.
27 Joseph S. Nye, Soft power: The means to success in world politics (Public Affairs, 2004).
28 According to the United Nations International Telecommunication Union’s seventh annual Measuring the 
Information Society Report, which ranks countries based on their infocomm development. 
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siders the South’s dependence on the United States oppressively colonial.  Moon 
has stated that he is keen to revive the Sunshine Policy of  greater friendship with 
North Korea begun in 2000 by the first Democrat President Kim Dae-jung and 
continued by Moon’s mentor President Roh Moo-hyun. At his inauguration, 
Moon announced his intention ‘to solve the crisis in national security’, saying 
that he would ‘go anywhere for the peace of  the Korean peninsula’. Moon has 
clearly stated that he wants his legacy to be that of  the man ‘who built a peaceful 
relationship between the North and South’.29 So it is unsurprising that Moon 
immediately accepted Kim Jong-un’s offer to send a delegation to the Winter 
Olympics in January 2018, and quickly agreed to the two Korean teams march-
ing together at the opening and closing ceremonies. Moon described this as a 
first step towards a new phase of  bilateral engagement.30 
Moon’s attraction to representing the Olympics as promising a new chapter 
for Korea aligns with the broader ROK nation-branding objectives around the 
Games. Alongside the South’s evident desire for the PyeongChang Olympics 
to carry positive messages about the peninsula to an international audience, 
Moon’s openness to relaunching positive engagement with the North adds to 
the likelihood that the DPRK viewed PyeongChang as a viable platform for 
projecting its own strategic communications. 
Strategic Communications on the Olympian Stage 
Choosing the Olympics as a venue for DPRK strategic communications sug-
gests an adroit reading of  the manner in which the Olympic stage amplifies 
positive messaging around reconciliation. These messages are carried by a range 
of  global media platforms accessed by key international target audiences, but are 
largely inaccessible to the population of  the North. Since the first modern-day 
Olympics in 1896, politics have been a part of  the international sporting compe-
tition. To make sense of  any DPRK strategic communications in Pyeongchang, 
it is necessary to outline what is distinctive about this as a context for national 
strategic communications, and with it, for the projection of  national power.31 
As Victor Cha notes, Olympic sport has long been intertwined with national 
projects fostering national prestige or rebirth, and has also often been mobilised 
29 Paula Hancocks and James Griffiths, ‘South Korea’s sunshine man: can Moon Jae-in fix the North Korea 
crisis?’, CNN.com, 20 January 2018.
30 Steve George and Tae-hoon Lee, ‘South Korean leader welcomes North Korean Olympic participation’, 
CNN.com, 2 January 2018.
31 Victor Cha, ‘Role of  Sport in International Relations: National Rebirth and Renewal’, Asian Economic Policy 
Review 11:1 (2016): 139–55.
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for the reconstruction and projection of  new aspirational roles and identities 
through strategic narratives.32 The Olympics constitute a uniquely pre-struc-
tured forum for strategic communications in any national interest, which facili-
tates certain types and forms of  messaging and inhibits others.
Olympic ‘mega events’ are widely seen as ideal platforms for the diffusion of  
international norms.33 The concept of  an ‘Olympic truce’ dating back to the 
ancient world, concretised in Pierre de Coubertin’s philosophy of  Olympism, 
views the Olympic games as intrinsically a celebration of  cross-cultural dia-
logue and understanding for the purpose of  global peace-building.34 In 1993, 
the Olympic truce was endorsed by the United Nations and, as UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan put it on the eve of  the 2008 games, the Olympic Truce 
‘can demonstrate to the world that peace is possible even in the most seeming-
ly intractable situations if  we work towards it’.35 This normative universalism 
constitutes a key interpretative frame by which communicative actions on the 
Olympic stage are read globally. 
Darren Van Tassel and Dean Terry note that sporting cooperation has been 
tightly bound up with the project of  peace and unification in the specific Korean 
context.36 The two Koreas marched together in the 2000, 2004, and 2006 Winter 
Olympics, and in the Asian Games of  2006. Both North and South Koreas are 
expressly committed to the project of  unification. Sport has thus ‘provided a 
venue for joint cooperation and a demonstration of  the ability of  the North and 
South Koreans to work together’.37 The expressed value of  sporting coopera-
tion for the development of  a common national consciousness may have led to 
overly hopeful paeans, but the forum of  Olympic sport clearly provides a space 
for safe interaction, the development of  interpersonal ties, and related negotia-
tions that may foster more peaceable relations in the future.38
Negotiations were undertaken ‘before the Beijing Games in Guangzhou in Sep-
tember 2005, where an agreement was reached in principle to field a united 
32 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication power and the new 
world order, Vol. 3 (Routledge, 2014).
33 Graeme Hayes and John Karamichas, (eds) Olympic Games, Mega-events and Civil Societies. Globalisation, Environ-
ment, Resistance (Palgrave, 2012), p. 12.
34 Ramon Spaaij, ‘Olympic rings of  peace? The Olympic movement, peace-making and intercultural under-
standing’ in Spaaij, Ramón, and Burleson, Cindy (eds) The Olympic movement and the sport of  peacemaking (Routledge, 
2016), p. 1.
35 Ibid., p. 5.
36 Van Tassell and Terry, ‘An overlooked path’, p. 56.
37 Ramon Spaaij, ‘Olympic rings of  peace?’, p. 57.
38 Ibid.
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team’, with a single unification flag and uniforms and a single national anthem. 
This effort was disrupted by nuclear tests and then by wrangling over how to 
divide the participants, and ‘in the end, the two countries only agreed to field 
a unified delegation of  supporters for the Beijing games’.39 Cooperation at the 
2018 Winter Olympics built expressly on this history. The pre-existing frame-
work of  Olympic dialogue and the history of  fragile cooperation between the 
Koreas in this arena suggest that the international surprise that met North Ko-
rean overtures was unwarranted. The DPRK’s headline-capturing expression of  
intent to participate in the February 2018 Winter Olympics, submitted in Janu-
ary 2018, was likely planned well in advance of  this date—this casts the hostile 
communications of  the preceding six months in a more strategic light.
Whilst the rhetoric of  Olympism is often ‘inflated’,40 it is not meaningless or un-
important to participant nations’ strategic communications in and around these 
events. The ‘meaning of  all strategic communications’ in international relations, 
by states or other actors, presupposes the existence of  practices that carry with 
them ethical precepts and conditions. These ethical terms are central to ‘the 
justifications, rationales, narratives and explanations’ that make up all strategic 
communicative actions: ‘For those terms to make sense to interlocutors, wheth-
er states or publics’, the interlocutors must pay attention to these settled norms 
and ethical conditions, even, or indeed especially, when an actor has poor inter-
national standing, as the DPRK does, and wishes to be improve that standing.41 
It is part of  the coding of  national Olympic communications that participants 
play by implicit communicative ‘rules of  the game’, involving an expression 
of  a commitment to dialogue and negotiation, and categorical opposition to 
conflict. The fundamental principles of  Olympism, based on the values artic-
ulated by the founder of  the International Olympic Committee and father of  
the modern Olympics, Pierre De Coubertin, is the ‘harmonious development 
of  humankind, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the 
preservation of  human dignity’.42 
This implicit content frames any national strategic communications at the 
Olympics. To violate the spirit of  the Olympic truce, which is to be perceived 
39 Cha, ‘Role of  Sport’.
Hayes and Karamichas, Olympic Games, Mega-events and Civil Societies, p. 143.
40 Stockdale, ‘More than just games’, p. 82.
41 Nicholas Michelsen and Mervyn Frost, ‘Strategic Communications in International Relations: Practical Traps 
and Ethical Puzzles’, NATO Defence Strategic Communications 2 (2017): 9–33.
42 The Olympic Charter (15 September 2017), p. 11. 
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as explicitly politicising the games, will invariably result in loss in standing and 
influence, and is, thus, likely to backfire from an international audience perspec-
tive. Negative messaging often has limited purchase on the Olympic stage. The 
discourse of  Olympism limits cases for exclusion, and calls for boycotts are 
often unsuccessful.43 A widespread boycott of  the 1980 Moscow Games, led 
by the US and followed by 62 other countries, ostensibly in protest against the 
Afghanistan War, was simply followed by a tit-for-tat boycott of  the subsequent 
Los Angeles Games in 1984.44 The IOC is only very occasionally forced into 
action, as in Mexico 1968, and with the sanctions that were put in place in 2017, 
the penalty for Russia’s apparently long-running nationwide doping operation. 
The Olympics have been viewed as an efficient forum for de-securitisation 
through positive international messaging.45 Authors have argued that the pursuit 
of  soft power generally characterises state communications at the Olympics.46 
Soft power refers to the ways in which states seek to get their way by attracting 
others to them, rather than by coercing them.47 As Jonathan Grix notes, ‘the 
Olympics—is clearly considered by states to provide a major contribution in the 
process of  improving their nation’s image, profiling and showcasing themselves 
globally and “attracting” others through inbound tourism, increased trade and 
a growing sense of  national pride through the often experienced, but under-re-
searched “feel-good” factor that accompanies major sports events’.48 Cha argues 
that the potential for reconstruction of  national identity is central to the value 
of  the Olympic Games, as with other sporting mega-events, for host nations in 
particular. He argues that whilst ‘sport can be a generator of  soft power’ interna-
tionally, it is often at least as important as a forum for nation-building, through 
the assertion of  coherent identities oriented by national pride: In this sense 
‘sport acts as a prism through which national identity gets refracted domestically 
and internationally’.49 
43 Charles Little, ‘The Sports Boycott against Rhodesia reconsidered’, in Paul Gilchrist and Russell Holden (eds), 
The Politics of  Sport: Community, Mobility, Identity (Routledge, 2012). 
44 Ibid.
45 Jonathan Grix, ‘Sport politics and the Olympics’, Political Studies Review 11.1 (2013): 15–25.
46 Ibid.
47 Joseph Nye and Youna Kim, ‘Soft power and the Korean Wave’ in Youna Kim (ed.) The Korean wave: Korean 
media go global (Routledge, 2013), p. 31.
48 Grix, ‘Sport politics and the Olympics’. Surveys on the 2012 London Olympics show that positive public 
is correlated with hosting such events. See BBC News, ‘Post-Olympic spirits high but may fizzle—Survey’, 14 
August 2012. However, there are questions about how lasting such effects are. Cases such as Montreal 1976 sug-
gest that there is also no guarantee that even a temporary feel-good factor will materialise. See Jack Todd, ‘The 
40-year hangover: how the 1976 Olympics nearly broke Montreal’, Guardian, 6 July 2016.
49 Cha, ‘Role of  Sport in International Relations’, p. 141.
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When South Korea hosted the Seoul Games of  1988, it was led by the author-
itarian administration of  Chun Doo-hwan. The regime made very effective use 
of  the games to ‘call world attention to South Korea’s economic miracle while 
simultaneously obfuscating and downplaying the repressive political practices 
that enabled such economic success’.50 The Seoul Games were an important 
element in South Korea’s ‘modernization project’, and marked the beginning of  
South Korea’s export of  cultural products, known as the ‘Korean wave’, or hal-
lyu.51 The success of  Seoul ‘88 led to the ROK hosting other major global events, 
including the Asian Games in 2002 and 2014, the FIFA World Cup in 2002, and 
the World Expo in Daejeon in 1993. International Public Relations giant Burson 
Marsteller formulated the country’s PR campaign for both the 1988 Olympics 
and the 2002 FIFA World Cup. Then regional head of  Burson, Bill Rylance, 
explained: ‘it’s a mix of  cohesive national pride blended with a deeply rooted 
need to show the world that Korea is a sophisticated and successful country’.52 
Whilst the concept of  soft power captures the manner in which the frame of  
Olympism inhibits negative messaging and reinforces positive messaging, this 
does not fully grasp the ways in which global influence may be garnered through 
communications on the Olympic stage. There is clearly tension between the glo-
balist normative rhetoric enshrined in the Olympic charter and the diverse na-
tional interests of  hosts and participants. The ‘pursuit of  soft power’ may not be 
entirely adequate in making sense of, for example, Nazi Germany’s triumphant 
posturing at the 1936 Berlin Games, or efforts by the super powers to reflect 
their ‘natural’ superiority by topping the medal tables during the Cold War. The 
Olympics is a stage for political communications operating in service of  hard 
power-political dynamics. There is always a risk to national communicators in 
overtly politicising the Olympics that such communications may backfire, or be 
hijacked by other actors as they were in Munich 1972 or Mexico 1968, but it 
nonetheless provides a powerful arena for the construction and maintenance of  
national brands amidst competitive international dynamics.53 
Differentiation of  target audiences is of  particular salience here.54 Whilst politi-
50 Stockdale, ‘More than just games’, p. 85.
51 Ji-Hyun Cho, and Alan Bairner, ‘The sociocultural legacy of  the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games’, Leisure Studies, 
31:3 (2012): 271–89.
52 Andrew Salmon, ‘A sporting host: how South Korea has continued to build on the legacy of  the Seoul Olym-
pics’, SCMP.com, 5 July 2015.
53 Roy Panagiotopoulou, ‘Nation branding and the Olympic games: New media images for Greece and Chi-
na’, The International Journal of  the History of  Sport, 29.16 (2012): 2337–48.
54 Akihiko Tanaka, ‘Comment on “role of  sport in international relations: national rebirth and renewal” ’, Asian 
Economic Policy Review, 11.1 (2016): 156–57.
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cal communications at the Olympics are framed by the discourse of  Olympism, 
that frame clearly does not preclude communication in service of  perceived 
national interests.55 Strategic Communications, as a key term of  reference here, 
seeks to capture the ways in which communications may be designed to achieve 
various strategic ends, and so must be tailored to discrete audiences, whether the 
intention is to (re)construct national identity, build international soft power, or 
intervene in the international discursive climate so as to nudge the decision mak-
ing of  another state or other states.56 In the Korean context, Olympic coopera-
tion in the past has ‘stood in’ for the pursuit of  political resolutions to the crisis 
on the peninsula, which has allowed the North to prepare more effectively for 
the next cycle of  tension.57 Periods during which the highest degree of  sporting 
cooperation took place between the two Koreas were also the periods during 
which development aid moved most smoothly from the South to the North, a 
process commonly seen as having allowed the North to reach its present nuclear 
and missile capability. 
Olympic coverage reaches global audiences, and is reported widely in interna-
tional media. Early estimates predicted that some three billion people would 
watch some coverage of  the 2018 Winter Games and the event was broadcast on 
television in more than 80 countries. The IOC’s director of  television and mar-
keting, Timo Lumme, notes that preliminary data showed overall output from 
the Games in South Korea was bigger than at any previous winter Olympics, 
with an average of  130 hours of  programming per rights-holding broadcaster.58 
As noted above, the Olympic stage is predisposed to reinforce positive messag-
ing around reconciliation and international cooperation. The scale and global 
extent of  the Olympic audience provides potential opportunities for communi-
cations to bypass media narratives that have become entrenched over time, as 
long as the new projected message coheres with the discourse of  Olympism.
As Manuel Castells argues, seeking to shift the tone of  media coverage, thus 
nudging discourses within the information environment surrounding an actor, 
event, process, or issue, is a well-documented method by which to influence the 
behaviour of  target audiences.59 A study of  the media coverage of  the six-party 
55 Brennan K. Berg et al., ‘A realist perspective of  sport and international relations: US governmental percep-
tions of  Olympic boycott movements, 1936–2008’, The ‘Olympic and Paralympic Effect’ on Public Policy (2016): 7.
56 Miskimmon et al., Strategic Narratives.
57 Van Tassell and Terry, ‘An overlooked path’, p. 56. 
58 Karolos Grohmann, ‘ “Global broadcasters” output up by 14 percent from Sochi: IOC’, Reuters, 20 February 
2018.
59 Manuel Castells, Communication Power (Oxford University Press, 2009).
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talks held between 2003 and 2007 on the Korean question revealed the vulnera-
bility of  international journalists to deliberate influence from the US and South 
Korean government officials, both of  which took a negative view on North 
Korea and emphasised the importance of  the North’s ‘rogue state’ dimension.60 
This became the dominant narrative in global media. The DPRK rarely enjoys a 
sympathetic hearing from international media, particularly the English-language 
media, which dominate global news coverage. This supposed ‘media bias’ is a 
subject of  complaint from the North.61
News coverage of  scandals, such as President Park’s impeachment and removal, 
show that media in the South are able to cover politics effectively and to crit-
icise the country’s institutions. The debate about relations with North Korea 
remains, however, tightly censored. Any discussion on the DPRK in South Ko-
rea is hampered by a national security law under which any article or broadcast 
favorable to the North is punishable by imprisonment.62 This is one of  the main 
grounds for online censorship.63 These legal constraints make it less likely that 
the domestic South Korean media, and by extension the population, would be a 
principal target audience for DPRK communications at the Olympics.
The Olympic forum is a rational choice for hosting a communications campaign 
aimed at softening international perceptions of  an autocratic regime by seeking 
to influence international media coverage.64 Of  particular interest to a country 
like the DPRK is the fact that narratives and images communicated at the Games 
are less subject to the filter of  English language international news media, which 
rarely portray the DPRK in a positive light. Olympic broadcast rights holder 
NBC says the overall audience in the US for prime-time Olympics across plat-
forms reached 26 million, slightly down from the viewing figures for previous 
Winter Olympics, but standing up well in the face of  generally falling television 
audience numbers.65 As noted above, the United States’ geopolitical significance 
for the Korean peninsula, and its active role in the international criticism of  
60 Seo, ‘International media coverage of  North Korea’.
61 Macau Daily Times, ‘North Korea Expels Three BBC Journalists Over Complaints of  Coverage’, 10 May 2016.
62 The issue is outlined by Reporters Without Borders in ‘South Korea: Distinct improvement after a bad 
decade’.
63 This censorship has been shown to be of  limited value to inhibiting the distribution of  rumours online. See 
K. Hazel Kwon and H. Raghav Roa, ‘Cyber-rumour sharing under a homeland security threat in the context of  
government Internet surveillance: The case of  South-North Korea conflict’, Government Information Quarterly, 34: 
2 (2015): 307–16.
64 Similar observations might be made with respect to Russia hosting the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
65 Josef  Adalian, ‘Why NBC Shouldn’t Worry About the Winter Olympics TV Ratings’, Vulture.com, 13 February 
2018.
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the DPRK that characterised the preceding six months, would suggest that US 
audiences are probably the key targets for a communications campaign making 
use of  the Olympic forum to soften media representations of  the DPRK. As a 
consequence, our initial analysis looks at a sample of  English-language media. 
The PyeongChang Winter Olympic Games likely also appealed to the North as a 
promising venue for international strategic communications aimed at Chinese au-
diences. The PyeongChang Games are the first of  three consecutive Olympics in 
Asia, with Tokyo hosting the 2020 Summer Games and Beijing staging the 2022 
Winter Olympics. While China sent only about 100 athletes to Pyeongchang, less 
than half  the number of  Team USA, with the country set to host the next Winter 
Games in 2022 it is likely that the DPRK judged that the games presented a unique 
opportunity for direct communication with the Chinese domestic public and Com-
munist Party target audiences. In China, Internet giants Tencent and Alisports (the 
online sports arm of  Alibaba) stream the Olympics alongside the main rights holder, 
CCTV, China’s state broadcaster.66 Tencent by itself  has about 500 million monthly 
subscribers to its video channel, which shows the scale of  the potentially accessible 
audience.67 Whilst this groundwork study does not assess Chinese-language media, 
a fuller multi-lingual comparative analysis will form the next stage in our research.
DPRK Strategic Communications at the Games
In early January 2017, Lee Hee-beom, head of  the organising committee for 
Pyeongchang 2018, announced to great fanfare that North Korean athletes 
would compete in four sports and that the two groups of  athletes would march 
together under the Korea Unification Flag at the opening ceremony in Feb-
ruary. North Korea would send athletes in pair figure skating, alpine skiing, 
cross-country skiing, and women’s ice hockey. It would be the first time that the 
two countries would compete as one nation at the Olympics.68 
Our media sample was limited in size and restricted to English-language media. 
As such, it provides only preliminary grounds for hypotheses that need to be 
more fully substantiated in larger-scale analysis. However, the content analysis 
identified three clear areas of  activity that featured in almost all the Olympic 
coverage touching on the DPRK: i) the stage-managed presentation of  Kim 
66 Emma Lee, ‘China is watching the Olympics with Internet companies instead of  state TV’, Technode.com, 9 
August 2018.
67 Bien Perez, ‘Tencent Video, iQiyi, in race to lead Chinas’ online video market’, SCMP.com, 2 October 2017. 
68 Yonhap News, ‘N. Korea to participate in four sports at PyeongChang 2018: top organizer’, 18 January 2018.  
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Jong-un’s sister Kim Yo-jong during the games, ii) a squad of  DPRK cheerlead-
ers, and iii) the opening and closing ceremonies. 
Whilst these DPRK activities did appear in domestic ROK media reports on the 
games, a range of  issues dominated local media reportage which were less preva-
lent in international media reports. Significant efforts had been made to provide 
English-language ticketing and booking facilities; the local train company Korail 
and Korea’s Google, Naver, translated their apps into English for the first time. 
Tickets for the venues appeared to be sold out, as were the trains from Seoul to 
the Olympic sites, yet seats in both remained empty. Perhaps due to concerns 
about rising tensions on the Peninsula during the lead up to the Games, many 
international visitors stayed away. Low domestic turnout for the games had the 
organisers scrambling to fill the seats in the stands. This is not a wholly unusual 
scenario for the Olympics, but the Pyeongchang sites were particularly remote. 
Limited expectations of  South Korean athletes winning medals, except perhaps 
in ice skating and speed skating, the expense of  tickets and local lodging, and 
the relative distance of  the Olympic sites from the major population centers, all 
featured in media reports of  a muted domestic reception.69 A team from Intel 
had put together the largest coordinated drone exhibition for the opening cere-
mony, only to have their performance cancelled at the last moment. Local media 
coverage of  the cancellation was limited, and the television audience was treated 
to a recording of  an earlier rehearsal. Reasons of  public safety were given to 
enquiries from the media, and the local team was told the ROK military had 
cancelled everything at the last moment.70
There was also a dispute with Japan over the flag the two Koreas had agreed to 
use in the opening ceremony; its depiction of  a unified Korea included disputed 
territory—a dot representing islands claimed by Japan, leading Tokyo to lodge a 
diplomatic protest.71 ROK media themes indicated a mixed local reaction to the 
North Korean presence. In Seoul, anti-North Korean demonstrations contin-
ued throughout the Olympics. There was concern expressed in national media 
over the fact that North Korean athletes were to replace South Korean hockey 
players who had trained for four years for the event and qualified. These con-
69 Tariq Panja, ‘Olympic Organizers Say Tickets Are Sold, but Where Are the People?’, New York Times, 15 
February 2018.
70 Michael Luciano, ‘Olympic opening ceremony drone show cancelled last minute’, ECNMag.com, 12 February 
2018. 
71 AFP, ‘South Korea to stop using Olympic flag with disputed isles after Japan protest’, SCMP.com, 5 February 
2018.
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cerns were amplified when it became clear that South Korea was paying for the 
North Korean delegation’s presence. 
Influencing public opinion in the South appears not to have been the key ob-
jective of  the DPRK, as evidenced by the decision of  the North to send one of  
its most contentious generals to the closing ceremony, which was a subject of  
widespread media discussion in the ROK. In what was presented as a last-min-
ute decision, South Korea’s Ministry of  Unification announced that General 
Kim Yong-chol, vice-chairman of  the ruling Workers’ Party’s Central Commit-
tee, would attend the closing ceremony and stay in the South for three days. Kim 
also heads the United Front Department, the North Korean office responsible 
for handling inter-Korean affairs. More controversially, he was previously chief  
of  the Reconnaissance General Bureau, a top North Korean military intelli-
gence agency, which South Korea blamed for the deadly 2010 sinking of  the 
Cheonan, a South Korean navy corvette.72 This decision, which appears to have 
had significantly more negative resonance locally than internationally, suggested 
some degree of  DPRK willingness to test South Korean audiences so as to cre-
ate propaganda for its own population. Public opinion in the South seems not to 
have been the priority for the DPRK, this may potentially have been because the 
Moon government was already committed to facilitating de-escalation. 
Domestic reception of  the DPRK’s presence at the Games was relatively muted. 
Our English-language media sample suggests that internationally the opposite 
was the case. North Korea’s belligerence in late 2017 ensured the world was pay-
ing attention when Pyongyang accepted the invitation to take part in the Games. 
It is possible that this decision was taken at the last minute, in light of  the impact 
of  sanctions and escalating rhetoric emerging from the United States before the 
end of  that year. It seems more likely, as the preceding sections outline, that the 
North had pre-determined at least the potential for this route to de-escalation. 
The three DPRK activities at the Olympics most prominent in English-language 
media reports broadly cohered in seeking to represent North Korea as a legiti-
mate state, ready to cooperate with the South in pursuit of  a unified Korea, and 
appear to have been targeted principally at an international audience. The US is 
likely to have been a key target audience for these messages. Given the tone of  
US communications about the DPRK in the months prior, it is unsurprising that 
72 Christine Kim and Hyon-hee Shin, ‘North Korean closing delegation includes man blamed for deadly sink-
ing’, Reuters, 22 February 2018.
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initial signals towards de-escalation at the Games were rebuffed by the US Vice 
president Mike Pence.73 As Washington vigorously warned against a North Ko-
rean charm offensive, athletes from the two Koreas entered the arena together 
under a unification flag, which was widely reported in the international media 
as offering hope of  a breakthrough in the geopolitical standoff.74 The pictures 
of  the athletes marching into the stadium side-by-side dominated most media 
coverage around the world. This was clear in our sample, where almost all of  the 
articles and news reports mentioned the joint presence of  the two Koreas at the 
opening ceremony, even describing it as ‘peace in motion’.75 The preceding peri-
od of  high tensions, and the sudden surprise move to participate, invited inter-
pretation of  the new spirit of  collaboration within the framework of  Olympism.
The obviously cool reaction by Vice President Pence to being seated close to 
Kim Jong-un’s sister in the South Korea President’s box was clearly meant for 
his US domestic audience, but also risked communicating failure to get into the 
spirit of  the Games. Pence was criticised for not standing up with the South 
Korea President and the rest of  the crowd when the unified team entered the 
stadium. This communicative bind could only play out to the benefit of  the 
DPRK, and contributed to widespread media representations of  the United 
States as haughty. North Korean state media reinforced this in warning that the 
conservatives in the US, Japan, and the ROK should not spoil the atmosphere 
of  détente. Kim and the DPRK have always sought to present themselves as the 
peacemakers, with their military stance one of  self-defence against an aggressive 
militarism from the South and its allies. In remaining relentlessly positive at the 
games, they maximised their ability to get this message across. CNN reported 
widely what Kim Yo-jong wrote in the South Korean President’s guestbook: ‘I 
hope Pyongyang and Seoul get closer in our people’s hearts and move forward 
the future of  prosperous unification.’76
The North’s communications at the Games centered on Kim Yo-jong, who be-
came the first member of  Pyongyang’s ruling dynasty to set foot in South Korea 
since the Korean War. Again, this was clear in our sample of  English-language 
73 Makiko Takita and Rui Abiru,‘Moon Jae-In’s Smile Vanishes as Shinzo Abe, Mike Pence Flaunt Bond’, Sankei 
Shimbun, 23 February 2018. 
74 Rich Motoko, ‘Olympics Open With Koreas Marching Together, Offering Hope for Peace’, New York Times, 
9 February 2018. 
75 Morgan Winsor, ‘Olympics 2018: Opening ceremony “Peace in Motion” kicks off  Pyeongchang Winter 
Games’, ABC News, 9 February 2018.
76 Will Ripley and James Griffiths, ‘North and South Korea to meet to discuss taking part in Paralympics’, CNN.
com, 23 February 2018. 
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media reportage, with Kim Yo-jong dominating news reports, appearing in most 
stories that discussed the PyeongChang Olympics and the North and South 
détente. Her presence appears to have played a key role in framing international 
media discourses away from the narrative of  the rogue state, and the more prob-
lematic presence of  General Kim Yong-chol. A significant sample of  reports 
fixed on Kim Yo-jong as a peacemaker carrying her brother’s wishes for peace. 
Kim Yo-jong is known to be a leading figure in the domestic propaganda and 
state communication institutional architecture. The success of  Kim Yo-jong in 
generating positive international media coverage of  the North Korean delega-
tion was significant, with 90 per cent of  such accounts mentioning her positive-
ly. Her words and actions were in constant resonance with the Olympic frame, 
sustaining message continuity, and framing the reportage of  her as the ‘Pyong-
yang Princess’, the human face of  a secretive regime. A story on CNN.com was 
typical of  the coverage, carrying the headline: ‘Kim Jong-un’s sister is stealing 
the show at the Winter Olympics’. Positioning Kim Yo-jong as Kim Jong-un’s 
Ivanka, the report suggested she was a ‘foil to the perception of  North Korea as 
antiquated and militaristic’. The DPRK’s domestic purpose in raising the profile 
of  Kim Jong-un’s wider family is difficult to ascertain, though Kim Yo-jong’s 
role here offers some support for presumptions about her significance to the 
regime’s stability.77 This role continued at the subsequent Singapore summit be-
tween Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump. 
The red-parka-clad North Korean cheerleaders also emerged as the domestic, 
international, and social media stars of  the early days of  the Olympics because 
of  their carefully choreographed songs and dances. First appearing at the open-
ing ceremony, they garnered the media epithet in South Korea of  the ‘army of  
beauties’. The all-female cheering squad and their singing performances piqued 
the interest of  Olympic fans worldwide, even though the North’s athletes, in-
experienced in international events, won no medals. The North Korean cheer-
leaders drew mixed responses, but their pictures were distributed around the 
world, emphasising the viral power of  the image.78 As messages about peace 
and unification were tied to images of  the cheerleaders, they were effective in 
pushing more unfavourable mention of  the North Korean regime to the bot-
tom of  articles. 
77  Myong-song Kim, ‘Kim Jong-un’s Sister Returns to Hero’s Welcome in Pyongyang’, The Chosunilbo, 13 Febru-
ary 2018. 
78 Neville Bolt, The Violent Image: Insurgent propaganda and the new revolutionaries (Columbia University Press, 2012).
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International media reports of  the reactions of  people from various countries 
who attended the Games were often gushing in their accounts of  the Korean 
cheerleaders. It was easy for the global media to pick up the story along with 
the great photo opportunities the cheerleaders provided. The positive media 
response to the cheerleading squad is perhaps surprising, as significant interna-
tional cynicism was generated at the 2010 FIFA World Cup when the North sent 
a tiny group of  uniformly dressed fans who cheered wildly at matches; they were 
filmed close-up, implying the stadium was full of  fans, when actually they were 
only a small group of  people in a confined area. The images of  the cheerleaders, 
suggestive of  North Korean propaganda but created by the South’s television 
coverage, may have invited satirisation. However, it remains an effective ex-
ample of  agenda-setting in that international media attention was kept on the 
North Korean presence. Even satirisation combined with critique, evident in a 
quarter of  over fifty media reports which mentioned them, may have contrib-
uted to softening representations of  the regime in the North. Given that these 
images were so conducive to distribution on social media, the cheerleaders may 
have been intended to sustain media attention on the DPRK presence at the 
Games, regardless of  their athletic successes.
In what was described in international media as an unprecedented and unex-
pected display of  unity, President Moon shook hands with Kim Yo-jong and 
Kim Yong-nam, North Korea’s ceremonial Head of  State and the highest-level 
official to have visited the South.79 A diplomatic fiasco at a state dinner hosted at 
the Blue House (the South Korean President’s executive office and official res-
idence, similar to the White House in the USA) before the opening ceremonies 
was widely reported.80 US Vice President Pence was to share a table with Kim 
Yong-nam. He arrived at the dinner, exchanged greetings with President Moon, 
Japanese Prime Minister Abe, and others, but avoided Kim Yong-nam and left 
before the meal was served. US Defence Secretary Jim Mattis was forced to 
deny explicitly any division between the US and South Korea, and Lee Nak-yon, 
the ROK’s Prime Minister, suggested that any summit would need the ‘right 
conditions’ to go ahead.81 It was clear that an informal summit, a deliberate 
breaking of  the ice, was what Mr Moon had intended.
There was no improvement in the atmosphere in President Moon’s box at the 
79 Benjamin Haas, ‘Pence skips Olympics dinner in snub to North Korean officials’, Guardian, 9 February 2018.
80 So-young Kim, ‘At Games reception, a hopeful dessert and a hasty exit’, Reuters, 9 February 2018. 
81 Bryan Harris and Katrina Manson, ‘Seoul seeks to ease US concerns about Korean détente’, FT.com, 12 
February 2018. 
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stadium for the closing ceremony. This time, the US was represented by Presi-
dent Donald Trump’s daughter Ivanka, who sat beside Moon’s wife, while North 
Korea’s Kim was seated a row behind. Sitting two seats along from him was 
General Vincent Brooks, the commander of  the United States Forces Korea 
headquarters. During his speech, Thomas Bach, President of  the Internation-
al Olympic Committee, invited several athletes to join him on stage, including 
South Korea’s gold medalist skeleton rider Yun Sung-bin and North Korean 
figure skater Ryom Tae-ok. The unease with which the US and Japan greeted 
this rapprochement between the North and the South was reflected in the local 
English-language media headlines. A poll conducted at the time suggested six 
out of  ten South Koreans thought the two Koreas should hold another round 
of  bilateral summit talks; among those in their 60s and older the percentage of  
support was less than half.82 In the ROK, the Moon administration’s approval 
ratings were recorded as dropping below 60 per cent for the first time since he 
took office.83 Domestic opinion in the ROK tends to be divided along the lines 
of  the familiar generational groups. Older, more conservative South Koreans 
are against improving relations with the North, while those in their 40s and 50s, 
generally Moon supporters, hope for improved relations. And the young are 
closer in opinion to older Koreans.84
The message from the North Korean state media was consistently celebratory 
and focused on peaceful reunification. Korean Central Television, which rarely 
shows live events, did not show the opening ceremony or any Olympics cov-
erage live. Indeed, early coverage from the broadcaster was limited to still im-
ages of  the Olympic competition published in its news bulletin—they showed 
Kim Yong-nam and Kim Jo-yong attending an ice hockey match where the two 
Koreas fielded the combined team, and a Taekwondo performance by athletes 
from both countries that was not part of  the official Olympic competition.85
Although North Korea’s visit to the Winter Olympics marked a step away from 
its normally isolationist position and ideological emphasis on self-reliance, the 
next steps were unclear. After the Games, keen to be seen as a peace-maker, 
President Moon continued to press for high-level meetings between Seoul and 
82 Yonhap News Agency, ‘Over 60 pct of  S. Koreans support proposed inter-Korean summit: poll’, N.K. News, 
15 February 2018.
83 Clint Work, ‘What Do Younger South Koreans Think of  North Korea?’, The Diplomat, 2 February 2018. 
84 Philip Lee and Steven Denney, ‘South Korea’s Identity Gap: Diverging Views on North Korea’, Sinonk.com, 23 
January 2017.
85 Williams Martyn, ‘Olympics notes: No coverage yet on KCTV’, North Korea Tech, 12 February 2018.
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Pyongyang, and for trilateral talks in South Korea between Pyongyang, Seoul, 
and Washington. The domestic South Korean media were more interested in 
Moon’s disagreements with his allies. In the international media this was less 
pronounced. The South’s national image-building efforts, promoting a ‘su-
per-connected Korea’ developing into a major player in the global creative econ-
omy, appear to have been overpowered in the international media by the North’s 
consistently positive messaging tied to the three themes that dominate the media 
sample analysed for this paper—the presence of  both Koreas at the Games, the 
photogenic North Korean cheerleaders, and Kim Jo-yong, the ‘Pyongyang Prin-
cess’. These strategic topics likely helped ensure the way the international media 
framed its reports about the Games, highlighting the potential for peace-build-
ing across the 38th parallel. Moon facilitated Pyongyang’s efforts, allowing it to 
substantively set the agenda attached to its own participation.
This required little from Kim Jong-un himself. He had used his annual tele-
vised New Year’s address to announce North Korea’s plan to participate in the 
PyeongChang Winter Olympics and to wish for their success. On the eve of  
the Games—just one day before the opening ceremony—Kim Jong-un presid-
ed over the annual military parade in Pyongyang to mark the founding of  its 
armed forces. News footage in North Korea showed him together with par-
ty officials watching the display of  military strength in the capital. The parade 
was not shown live on state television, but in a speech marking the event Kim 
said the parade underlined ‘the status of  the Democratic People’s Republic of  
Korea, which has developed into a world-class military power’.86 Having es-
tablished a narrative of  military security aimed at his domestic audience, Kim 
remained quiet throughout the Games, leaving DPRK international strategic 
communications to his sister and her ‘army of  beauties’. Once the Games had 
concluded, the tone of  Kim’s international communications shifted—after ex-
changing insults with Trump in late 2017, he was now asserting a willingness to 
de-nuclearise, but only if  unspecified conditions were met. Following a summit 
with Trump (announced, cancelled, then rescheduled and held in Singapore in 
June 2018), Kim was rewarded with a long-desired strategic objective for his 
regime—the suspension of  joint ROK-US military exercises. 
As the Olympics began, there was very little evidence of  appetite within the 
United States government for a rapprochement with the North. This suggests 
86 Yonhap News Agency, ‘N. Korea displays ICBMs during low-key military parade’, Korea Herald, 8 February 
2018. 
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that the Olympics took place at an inflection point, after which there was a shift 
in US strategy. The international impact of  the strategic communications cam-
paign that the DPRK conducted at the Olympics contributed to the context for 
that change. The sentiment in our sample of  English-language media, as well as 
the content of  the reportage, appear to have been influenced by DPRK activi-
ties at the Olympics. In the conclusion below, we set out the resultant hypothesis 
for further empirical testing.
Discussion and conclusions
Identifying stakeholders, both actual and potential, is at the heart of  all effec-
tive strategic communications.87 It is also important to identify the behavioural 
change sought and the significance of  the communication for political action—
in other words, why stakeholders should pay attention. Strategic communica-
tions must be proactive if  they are to be effective—setting the agenda, rather 
than merely responding and recruiting allies in what the media could use as par-
ticipative stories. Effective communications on the global political stage involve 
providing stories for multiple media platforms while ensuring that all these sto-
ries have arguments, anecdotes, illustrations, and actions, communicated step 
by step, from the headlines throughout the entire article. Each communication 
must fit a broader narrative, integrating key themes in pursuit of  desired be-
havioural change. Success is a matter of  creating the proper setting for desired 
behaviours to emerge. 
Ensuring continuity of  attention is also critical for agenda setting. The DPRK 
ran a successful strategic communications campaign insofar as it ensured its 
own coverage. In large part this was because the narrative of  peace-building and 
reconciliation was already prefigured by the idea of  the Olympic Games, and the 
regime needed to do little more than keep this idea in the frame. Using simple 
but visually arresting communications at Pyeongchang, North Korea got the 
world to talk about their country.
The Olympics were an opportunity to invite the US and China to engage with 
the DPRK as a ‘normal state’ without its having to offer significant material 
concessions. The Olympic forum amplified the positive messaging around rec-
onciliation, and increased the public diplomatic costs of  appearing belligerent. 
The ROK desired to communicate a positive message about Moon’s hope of  
87 Neale Consultants Limited—Building Executive Presence, communication tools.
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relaunching negotiations with the North; the timing of  the Olympics was ideal 
for the DPRK to pursue de-escalation. The North anticipated that Moon would 
amplify any message of  positivity and contribute to shaping international media 
coverage. It made sense for the DPRK to use the Winter Olympics in Pyeongc-
hang to strategically promote a softer image of  the Kim regime. 
The PyeongChang Winter Olympics provided the means for the DPRK to gain 
access to, for them, an unprecedented international audience. We have provi-
sionally gauged the effectiveness of  DPRK strategic communications by iden-
tifying the degree to which they shaped English-language media representation 
during the Games, although effectiveness in shaping the agenda and the tone of  
coverage does not prove causal influence on the behaviour of  others. Assessing 
the degree to which the DPRK’s effectiveness in agenda-setting at the Olym-
pics translated into influence over the decision-making of  international actors 
would require knowing which media reports were consumed by key decision 
makers. We have no data on which international media reports about North Ko-
rea shaped by DPRK communications had an effect on their target audiences. 
Whilst psychologists such as Daniel Kahneman have shown that ‘mere exposure 
effects’ (priming, framing, and anchoring) shape actors’ understandings and ori-
entate their actions,88 it is difficult to quantify the relationship between media 
consumption and behavioural change.89 There are ‘growing signs of  inefficiency 
and even gridlock in the variety of  ways framing, agenda setting, and priming 
theory are used by researchers’.90 The shifting tone of  international media re-
ports regarding the Olympics is suggestive, but without further comparative 
research we can only provide grounds for a reasoned hypothesis. 
Since the Olympic Games, international actors’ behaviour aligns with what may 
reasonably be assumed to have been the DPRK’s strategic objectives for Pyeo-
ngchang—less hostile communications with the US, as well as more friendly and 
direct communications between Kim and China’s President Xi Jinping. Trump 
actively contributed to detoxifying the Kim regime by celebrating their exchange 
of  ‘beautiful’ letters. And, as noted above, the cancellation of  joint military ex-
ercises between the US and the ROK has long been a strategic objective of  the 
88 Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (Penguin; Reprint edition, 2012).
89 Michael Scharkow and Marko Bachl, ‘How measurement error in content analysis and self-reported media 
use leads to minimal media effect findings in linkage analyses: A simulation study’, Political Communication 34.3 
(2017): 323–43.
90 Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, ‘Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of  Three 
Media Effects Models’, Journal of  Communication 57 (2007): 9–20, p. 18. 
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North. At the very least, we can be confident that a DPRK strategic communi-
cations campaign was conducted at the PyeongChang Games, and that North 
Korea probably considers it to have been effective. Whether or not the per-
ception is accurate, the changes in political attitudes among states will certainly 
influence the behaviour of  the DPRK in the future, for example by reinforcing 
policy-making that seeks international influence through interventions in the 
information environment.  
Few will conclude that the DPRK has altered its fundamental strategic calcula-
tion—it completed its last missile launch in November 2017. It is possible to 
overvalue the ‘art’ of  strategic communications.91 Behaviour is always multi-caus-
al. The Olympic Games provided a springboard from which the DPRK could 
achieve more positive media coverage from outlets that have previously tended 
to create overwhelmingly negative publicity. The Olympics interrupted global 
discourses about the legitimacy of  different policy responses to North Korea’s 
behaviour, and also interrupted the narrative of  military pressure the Trump 
administration had constructed during 2017.
This suggests that DPRK strategic communications at the PyeongChang Olym-
pics helped set the stage for further action, including the meeting between Pres-
ident Trump and Kim Jong-un in the aftermath of  the games. The traditional 
emphasis in International Relations scholarship on hard power, in association 
with formal diplomacy, as a route to assessing and influencing the comparative 
effects of  sanctions as potential determinants of  behavioural change can miss 
the role of  carefully timed, subtle influence on the tone of  international dis-
course, which nudges, facilitates, or discourages actions in world politics. The 
DPRK’s communications on the Olympic stage successfully shaped internation-
al coverage and influenced the information environment, which, at least to some 
extent, shaped the conduct of  politicians, and so of  world politics. This much 
is true, even if  a definitive measurement of  their effect requires more extensive 
sampling and analysis of  global media content.
Affecting the tone of  international discourse in world politics at a strategic mo-
ment, even minutely, can be useful for foreign policy; it can buy time to prepare 
new policy strategies and make it more difficult for opponents to leverage the 
‘rogue state’ label. The DPRK’s campaign sought to influence the perception 
of  states’ behaviour and attitudes by international actions. The DPRK’s Olym-
91 James P. Farwell, Persuasion and Power: The art of  strategic communication, (Georgetown University Press, 2012).
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pic strategic communications helped Kim Jong-un to reframe North Korea’s 
nuclear testing as preparation for engagement with the world, an engagement 
in which North Korea would be perceived a ‘normal’ state in global diplomatic 
processes. It also, at least temporarily, helped undercut calls for military action 
emerging from hawks in the United States administration, such as John Bolton. 
Given that various regional actors were now engaging diplomatically with the 
DPRK regime, and with apparent positive results, it became much more difficult 
to make a credible argument for escalation.
Sensitive to the opportunities presented by shifting media narratives, Trump 
immediately claimed personal responsibility for the inter-Korean détente. His 
assertion of  a foreign policy victory has at least as much to do with US domestic 
politics as with any expectation that the talks will actually lead to de-nuclear-
isation, but in Pyongyang this would only reinforce the sense that the irenic 
campaign at the Olympics was a well-timed strategic intervention by the North, 
reading the US domestic context effectively. Trump enthusiastically seized the 
opportunity presented by the Olympian moment to mint a commemorative coin 
celebrating the planned peace summit. The coin was announced in May 2017, 
with a price of  $US 100.  When in June the summit was called off, the price was 
discounted; the summit was rescheduled and finally occurred in September. In 
his 2018 speech to the UN, Trump lauded the de-escalation of  tension on the 
Korean peninsula as one of  his major foreign policy achievements, irrespective 
of  any evidence that the North was taking steps towards de-nuclearisation.
Cognisant of  China’s being selected to host the next Winter Olympics, the 
DPRK also appears to have used the PyeongChang Olympic platform to di-
rectly address Chinese audiences, in hopes of  demonstrating the DPRK’s rea-
sonableness and openness to diplomacy; Beijing allowed Kim to make this pre-
sentation to its populace, a significant fact in a country that exercises tight control 
on what the public is allowed to see. After the Olympics, Kim met with Chinese 
President Xi twice before meeting with Trump; China was his first overseas des-
tination as Head of  State. These trips contributed to developing his international 
diplomatic standing and support our hypothesis of  the importance of  China as a 
target audience. Post-Olympic diplomacy has created a dynamic in which China 
and the US must now compete for influence, or the impression of  influence, on 
the North Korean regime.92 This reflects the established cyclical historical pattern 
92  Samuel S. Kim, ‘US-China competition over nuclear North Korea’, Insight Turkey 19.3 (2017): 121–38.
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of  strategic action by the North.  
The North’s Olympic communications leveraged public attitudes of  the new 
leader in the South, and facilitated the development of  a personal relationship 
between Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in. Having staked his premiership on im-
proving inter-Korean relations, Moon will not easily give up on this possibility, 
and has shown himself  open to extending talks regardless of  the relationship be-
tween Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump. The Olympics have in no way precluded 
a breakdown in talks or the resumption of  conflict, nor should we assume that a 
lasting or significant shift in global public opinion has taken place. North Korea’s 
success in agenda-setting at Pyeongchang seems to have, at the very least, bought 
the regime some time. This may have been a limited aim of  the North’s Olympic 
campaign. The DPRK’s Olympic communications do not allow us to determine 
what their strategic endgame might be. But they show how the Olympics may 
be used as a forum by states for their strategic communications in seeking to 
influence the conditions under which actions can take place in world politics.
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